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Abstract
To date, most applications of algebraic analysis and
attacks on stream ciphers are on those based on lin-
ear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). In this paper, we
extend algebraic analysis to non-LFSR based stream
ciphers. Specifically, we perform an algebraic analysis
on the RC4 family of stream ciphers, an example of
stream ciphers based on dynamic tables, and inves-
tigate its implications to potential algebraic attacks
on the cipher. This is, to our knowledge, the first pa-
per that evaluates the security of RC4 against alge-
braic attacks through providing a full set of equations
that describe the complex word manipulations in the
system. For an arbitrary word size, we derive alge-
braic representations for the three main operations
used in RC4, namely state extraction, word addition
and state permutation. Equations relating the inter-
nal states and keystream of RC4 are then obtained
from each component of the cipher based on these al-
gebraic representations, and analysed in terms of their
contributions to the security of RC4 against algebraic
attacks. Interestingly, it is shown that each of the
three main operations contained in the components
has its own unique algebraic properties, and when
their respective equations are combined, the resulting
system becomes infeasible to solve. This results in a
high level of security being achieved by RC4 against
algebraic attacks. On the other hand, the removal of
an operation from the cipher could compromise this
security. Experiments on reduced versions of RC4
have been performed, which confirms the validity of
our algebraic analysis and the conclusion that the full
RC4 stream cipher seems to be immune to algebraic
attacks at present.
1 Introduction
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers, introduced by
Courtois & Meier (2003) and Courtois (2004), are at-
tacks in which the keystream is used to construct a
system of multivariate polynomial equations with the
keys or initial states of the stream ciphers as variables.
Solving the system of equations amounts to recover-
ing the keys or initial states. This method of attack
was initially applied to block ciphers and public key
cryptosystems (Courtois 2001, Courtois & Pieprzyk
2002). Algebraic analysis has been demonstrated at
times to be a very useful tool for stream ciphers based
on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). Several
well known LFSR-based stream ciphers have fallen to
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algebraic attacks (Al-Hinai et al. 2006, Armknecht &
Krause 2003, Cho & Pieprzyk 2004, Courtois 2004,
2003, Courtois & Meier 2003, Wong et al. 2006). It is
therefore appropriate to extend algebraic analysis to
other well-known ciphers that are not based on LF-
SRs, in order to evaluate the possibility of successful
algebraic attacks on them. This is the primary aim
of this paper.
In this paper, we perform an algebraic analysis
of the RC4 family of stream ciphers (Schneier 1996),
which is a word-based stream cipher based on dy-
namic tables. We show how valid algebraic relations
among the internal states of the cipher are obtained,
in order to form a full system of equations describing
the cipher. We then investigate the equations and
evaluate the resistance of RC4 to algebraic attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
on a full algebraic analysis of RC4. The types and
number of equations generated from the cipher are
discussed, and can be used as a guide for the level
of security of RC4 against algebraic attacks, both at
present and for future reference, as solution meth-
ods for large equation systems may become more ef-
ficient over time. The methods of analysis and re-
sults presented here could also be extended to RC4
variants, such as RC4A (Paul & Preneel 2004) and
VMPC (Zoltak 2004).
To date, RC4 remains a widely used stream cipher
in network and wireless applications, as well as in
many commercial products. It is a word-based stream
cipher, whose simple and elegant design by Rivest
in 1987 had been kept secret until 1994. After the
specification of the RC4 was revealed, the cipher be-
came the target for cryptanalysis. The first published
cryptanalysis of RC4 was by Golic´ (1997), followed by
a number of interesting ones (Knudsen et al. 1998,
Fluhrer & McGrew 2000, Mantin & Shamir 2001,
Paul & Preneel 2003, 2004). Weaknesses identified in
the RC4 cipher have motivated the proposal of several
strengthened versions of RC4, such as RC4A (Paul
& Preneel 2004). Other researchers were inspired
by the design of the cipher and proposed stream ci-
phers based on the design of RC4 such as the 32 and
64-bit RC4 (Gong et al. 2005) and VMPC (Zoltak
2004). However, distinguishing attacks have since
been shown to be effective on both the original and
strengthened proposals of RC4 and on new RC4 vari-
ants (Maximov 2005, Tsunoo et al. 2005). Cryptanal-
ysis of RC4 remains an active topic with recent devel-
opments in improved state and key recovery attacks
(Biham & Carmeli 2008, Maximov & Khovratovich
2008, Basu et al. 2009).
In order to provide an algebraic analysis of the
RC4 stream cipher, we first show how algebraic re-
lationships can be obtained for the operations within
the cipher. The three main operations used in RC4,
namely word addition, state extraction and state per-
mutation will be analysed. Algebraic representations
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for each of these three operations will be derived, and
some of their properties will be discussed. Then, we
convert these operations into valid expressions relat-
ing the internal states and keystream, and construct
a system of polynomial equations from them. The
solution of the system would amount to the recovery
of the initial states. We analyse how each of the op-
erations contribute to the number of equations gener-
ated, their respective degrees and form. We arrive at
an observation that these three main operations con-
tributes uniquely to the system of equations derived
from the RC4 stream cipher, which give a high level
of resistance to algebraic attacks only when combined
into one cipher.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a description of RC4. In section 3, we show how
algebraic relations for the operations involved in RC4
can be obtained. In section 4, we construct equations
that relate the initial states to the keystream for RC4.
Section 5 provides a summary and analysis of the re-
sults, which are then used to determine the security
of RC4 against algebraic attacks. Section 6 gives an
account on actual attempts of algebraic attacks on
the cipher using the methods presented. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Description of RC4
The RC4 family of stream ciphers is a word-based
stream cipher, which has a very large internal state
space compared to the key size. For a word size of n
bits, it consists of a permutation table of 2n words and
two pointers i, j of one word each. The total internal
state space of RC4 is therefore of size log2(2
n!(2n)2)
bits. For the common implementation with n = 8,
this is approximately 1700 bits. Two algorithms gov-
ern the RC4 stream cipher, namely the key scheduling
algorithm (KSA) and the pseudo-random generation
algorithm (PRGA). In the KSA, a secret key k is used
to load and mix the internal states Si of the regis-
ter S, resulting in S having some permutation of the
2n possible n-bit words. The PRGA then proceeds
to generate keystream using the states obtained from
the KSA. The KSA and PRGA for RC4 are shown in
Figure 1. The operations described in the pseudocode
are wordwise and the keystream output is denoted by
z.
KSA(k)
for i = 0 to 2n − 1
Si ← i
j ← 0
for i = 0 to 2n − 1
j ← j + Si + ki mod 2
n
Swap(Si, Sj)
return S
PRGA(S)
i ← 0
j ← 0
loop
i ← i + 1 mod 2n
j ← j + Si mod 2
n
Swap(Si, Sj)
z ← SSi+Sj
output z
Figure 1: The KSA of RC4 (top), The PRNG of RC4
(bottom).
During the KSA, the identity permutation
(0, 1, ..., 2n − 1) is loaded into the register S. The
secret key k is then used to initialize S to a random
permutation by shuffling the words in S according to
the KSA. Once the KSA is complete, the cipher is
ready for keystream generation. The PRGA is used
to produce pseudo-random keystream words derived
from the permutations in S. Each iteration of the
PRGA loop produces one output word z, which con-
stitutes n bits of keystream. In this paper, we con-
sider the cipher from the start of the PRGA, to arrive
at an initial state recovery algebraic analysis and at-
tack, where the initial state is the permutation in S
at that time.
3 Algebraic Analysis of RC4
The RC4 stream cipher of word size n uses one regis-
ter S of length 2n−1 with an n-bit word representing
each state of S. Commonly, RC4 is used with n = 8.
However, we will present an algebraic analysis that is
applicable for arbitrary n. Before key initialisation,
the states of S are set such that
S = (0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1).
The cipher then initialises according to the KSA,
which depends on the key k used. After the KSA, the
register S arrives at its intitial state S0, such that
S0 = (x0, x1, . . . , x2n−1),
where xi are n-bit words represented as elements in
Z/2nZ. Throughout this paper, we utilise the canoni-
cal isomorphism between the residue class ring Z/2nZ
representing integers modulo 2n and the product ring
F
n
2 representing the bit strings of those integers, so
that all equations describing RC4 are generated as
polynomials with coefficients in F2, with the word
variables in Z/2nZ also split into bit variables in F2.
From here onwards, for u ∈ Z/2nZ and 0 ≤ b ≤ n−1,
let u(b) ∈ F2 be the b-th least significant bit (LSB)
of u ∈ Z/2nZ, and u = (u(0), u(1), . . . , u(n−1)) ∈ F
n
2
be the binary vector representing u. Additionally, to
denote the b-th least significant bit of a state k of
register S, we use the notation Sk,(b). While the ring
Z/2nZ or the extension field F2n are possible candi-
dates for this algebraic analysis, we have chosen not to
use them due to their associated cumbersome repre-
sentations and manipulations, compared to the much
simpler arithmetic in F2. In addition, there exists
some technical difficulties for using these structures,
as will be explained in the successive sections. We
now derive the algebraic expressions of operations in-
volved in RC4.
3.1 State Extraction
The value of one state Si in the register S at position
i is at times needed. As i is considered unknown, it
is not possible to simply represent it as Si in an alge-
braic analysis. Instead, we must derive an algebraic
expression that extracts the correct word in S for any
possible value of i. This state extraction operation
is algebraically equivalent to evaluating the piecewise
expression
Si =


S0, i = 0
S1, i = 1
...
S2n−1, i = 2
n − 1,
where S and i can be unknown. This expression can
be split into n independent expressions, one for each
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bit Si,(b) of Si, where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Each of these ex-
pressions is dependent on all bits i(0), i(1), . . . , i(n−1)
of i, such that
Si,(b) =


S0,(b), i = (0, 0, . . . , 0)
S1,(b), i = (0, 0, . . . , 1)
...
S2n−1,(b), i = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
, 0 ≤ b ≤ n−1.
Since the variables are in F2, the piecewise expression
for each bit can then be arranged analogously as a
boolean expression and written as
Si,(b) =
2n−1∑
u=0
(
Su,(b)
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + u(b) + 1)
)
.
Here, the expression in the brackets is one when i = u
and zero otherwise, resulting in the correct bits of Si
being evaluated. If we instead use the residue class
ring Z/2nZ to describe state extraction operation, it
is not possible to convert the piecewise expression into
a single algebraic expression, since we are not able
to find a function that gives a nonzero value for the
correct index i and give zeros for the other indices.
Therefore, this operation has prevented us from using
word-based algebraic analysis in Z/2nZ. The above
expression is ordered by Su with polynomials in i(b) as
coefficients. This can be rewritten to order by degrees
of monomials in i(b) with Sk as coefficients as
Si,(b) =
2n−1∑
e=0

n−1∏
f=0
i
e(f)
(f)
(
2n−1∑
k=1
Sk,(b)
(
n−1∏
g=0
e(g)(i(g) + 1) + 1
)))
.
Consider a bit position Si,(b) throughout the entire
register. Due to the fact that S is a permutation of its
initial states, the values of that position must contain
an equal number of zeros and ones, which means that
2n−1∑
k=0
Sk,(b) = 0, 0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
Therefore, the expressions for state extraction can be
reduced to
Si,(b) =
2n−2∑
e=0

n−1∏
f=0
i
e(f)
(f)
(
2n−1∑
k=1
Sk,(b)
(
n−1∏
g=0
e(g)(i(g) + 1) + 1
)))
.
This removes the degree n+1 terms in the expression,
and we are left with expressions of maximum degree
n for the state extraction of Si. For example, with
n = 2 the expression is
Si,(b) = i(0)i(1)S0,(b) + i(0)i(1)S1,(b)
+ i(0)i(1)S2,(b) + i(0)i(1)S3,(b)
+ i(0)S0,(b) + i(0)S3,(b)
+ i(1)S1,(b) + i(1)S3,(b) + S3,(b)
= i(0)S0,(b) + i(0)S3,(b)
+ i(1)S1,(b) + i(1)S3,(b) + S3,(b),
since S0 + S1 + S2 + S3 = 0. The expression for Si,(b)
is therefore of degree 2.
3.2 Word Addition
The addition operation in RC4 is defined as word ad-
dition modulo 2n, which we denote as +2n , as op-
posed to +, which is understood as addition modulo
2 throughout this paper, unless otherwise indicated.
To obtain the equivalent operations using bit values
in F2, we use the additive group isomorphism between
Z/2nZ and Fn2 induced by addition on the binary dig-
its of integers modulo 2n. Let u, v, w ∈ Z/2nZ such
that
u +2n v = w.
The equivalent addition over the binary digits in Fn2
is defined as
u + v = (u(0), u(1), . . . , u(n−1))
+ (v(0), v(1), . . . , v(n−1))
= (w(0), w(1), . . . , w(n−1))
= w,
where w(b) satisfies
w(b) =
b−1∑
k=0
(
u(k)v(k)
b−1∏
l=k+1
(u(l) + v(l))
)
+ u(b) + v(b), 0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
With this definition, we obtain have the additive
group isomorphism
w(b) = (u +2n v)(b) = u(b) + v(b).
This amounts to degree n + 1 expressions in the bit
variables for addition. It can be seen that these ex-
pressions are independent of n. If we were to obtain
the algebraic expressions for word addition in the ex-
tension field F2n , we would have to extract the in-
dividual carry bits using, for example, trace maps.
This procedure is quite complex and will most likely
yield high degree equations. Therefore, we have de-
cided against using F2n for this algebraic analysis.
The first few expressions in increasing bit significance
are as follows.
w(0) = u(0) + v(0),
w(1) = u(0)v(0) + u(1) + v(1),
w(2) = u(1)u(0)v(0) + v(1)u(0)v(0),
+ u(1)v(1) + u(2) + v(2),
w(3) = u(1)u(2)u(0)v(0) + u(1)v(2)u(0)v(0),
+ u(2)v(1)u(0)v(0) + v(1)v(2)u(0)v(0),
+ u(1)u(2)v(1) + u(1)v(1)v(2),
+ u(2)v(2) + u(3) + v(3).
3.3 State Permutation
Swapping states i, j in S can be algebraically de-
scribed as the action of a permutation matrix M on
S. Given i, j, the entries mr,s of M are constructed
as follows.
• A diagonal entry mr,r is set if i = j or both i 6= r
and j 6= r,
• An off-diagonal entry mr,s is set if {i, j} = {r, s}.
Using the above rules, the appropriate boolean func-
tion used by each entry mr,s of M in the bits i(b), j(b)
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could be created, in a similar way as the state extrac-
tion operation. The diagonal entries can be expressed
as
mr,r =
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b)+j(b)+1)+
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + r(b) + 1)
)
×
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(j(b) + r(b) + 1)
)
+
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + j(b) + 1)
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + r(b) + 1)
)
×
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(j(b) + r(b) + 1)
)
.
The off-diagonal entries can be expressed as
mr,s =
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + r(b) + 1)
n−1∏
b=0
(j(b) + s(b) + 1)
+
n−1∏
b=0
(i(b) + s(b) + 1)
n−1∏
b=0
(j(b) + r(b) + 1) = ms,r.
The resulting matrix M is always symmetric. For
example, the permutation matrix with n = 2 is
M =


m0,0 m0,1 m0,2 m0,3
m0,1 m1,1 m1,2 m1,3
m0,2 m1,2 m2,2 m2,3
m0,3 m1,3 m2,2 m3,3

 ,
with entries
m0,0 = i(0)i(1) + j(0)j(1)
+ i(0) + i(1) + j(0) + j(1) + 1,
m0,1 = i(0)i(1)j(1) + i(1)j(0)j(1) + i(0)i(1) + i(0)j(1)
+ i(1)j(0) + j(0)j(1) + i(0) + j(0),
m1,1 = i(0)i(1) + j(0)j(1) + i(0) + j(0) + 1,
m0,2 = i(0)i(1)j(0) + i(0)j(0)j(1) + i(0)i(1) + i(0)j(1)
+ i(1)j(0) + j(0)j(1) + i(1) + j(1),
m1,2 = i(0)i(1)j(0) + i(0)i(1)j(1) + i(0)j(0)j(1)
+ i(1)j(0)j(1) + i(0)j(1) + i(1)j(0),
m2,2 = i(0)i(1) + j(0)j(1) + i(1) + j(1) + 1,
m0,3 = i(0)i(1)j(0) + i(0)i(1)j(1) + i(0)j(0)j(1)
+ i(1)j(0)j(1) + i(0)i(1) + j(0)j(1),
m1,3 = i(0)i(1)j(0) + i(0)j(0)j(1),
m2,3 = i(0)i(1)j(1) + i(1)j(0)j(1),
m3,3 = i(0)i(1) + j(0)j(1) + 1.
The entries of M have maximum degree n+1. In the
following section, we will show how these algebraic
representations can be used to describe RC4 in an
algebraic attack.
4 Equation Generation
In this section, we present techniques of equation gen-
eration for RC4. By introducing variables at each step
of the algorithm, we can keep the equations generated
to be of relatively low degrees, which could reduce so-
lution time of the final system of equations. Where
possible, we also show low degree multiples of the
equations generated, which could be used to simplify
the system further (Courtois 2003). Let St, it, jt be
the values of S, i, j respectively at the end of clock
t, where t ≥ 0. We then have S0, i0, j0 representing
the initial states of S, i, j respectively. The relations
among these internal states of RC4 and the keystream
can then be expressed as follows.
it = it−1 +2n 1 (pointer increment),
jt = jt−1 +2n S
t−1
i (pointer addition),
St = MSt−1 (state permuation),
zt = StSt
i
+2nS
t
j
(keystream generation).
Each operation shown above will be algebraically
analysed below.
4.1 Pointer Increment
In the first step, i is incremented by one. This addi-
tion is represented by
it(0) = i
t−1
(0) + 1,
it(b) = i
t−1
(b) +
b−1∏
k=0
it−1(k) , 1 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
Since it is known that i0 = 0, the values of it are
actually known for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, no equations
are needed to describe this step.
4.2 Pointer Addition
The contents of Si are then extracted, which gives
Sti,(b) =
2n−1∑
k=0
(
Stk,(b)
n−1∏
l=0
(it(l) + k(l) + 1)
)
,
0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
From the analysis in section 3.1, this can be expressed
as
Sti,(b) =
2n−1∑
e=0

n−1∏
f=0
i
e(f)
(f)
(
2n−1∑
k=1
Sti,(k)
(
n−1∏
g=0
e(g)(i(g) + 1) + 1
)))
.
The addition for j is then given as follows.
jt(0) = j
t−1
(0) + S
t
i,(0),
jt(b) =
b−1∑
k=0
(
jt−1(k) S
t
i,(k)
b−1∏
l=k+1
(jt−1(l) + S
t
i,(l))
)
+ jt−1(b) + S
t
i,(b), 1 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
This gives n equations of maximum degree n with n
variables representing j(0), j(1), . . . , j(n−1) introduced
at each clock. It is possible to move all terms to the
left hand side and multiply the resulting expression
by (jt−1(b−1) + 1)(S
t−1
i,(b−1) + 1) to obtain
(jt−1(b−1) + 1)(S
t−1
i,(b−1) + 1)(j
t−1
(b) + S
t
i,(b) + j
t
(b)) = 0.
This would yield equations of maximum degree 3 for
the this word addition operation.
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4.3 State Permutation
The new pointers it, jt are then used for state permu-
tation in register S. Similar to the derivation before,
the diagonal entries of the permutation matrix M are
given by
mtr,r =
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b)+j
t
(b)+1)+
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + r
t
(b) + 1)
)
×
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(jt(b) + r
t
(b) + 1)
)
+
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + j
t
(b) + 1)
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + r
t
(b) + 1)
)
×
(
1 +
n−1∏
b=0
(jt(b) + r
t
(b) + 1)
)
.
The off-diagonal entries are given by
mtr,s =
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + r
t
(b) + 1)
n−1∏
b=0
(jt(b) + s
t
(b) + 1)
+
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + s
t
(b) + 1)
n−1∏
b=0
(jt(b) + r
t
(b) + 1) = m
t
s,r.
It can be observed that multiplying each entry mr,s
of the permutation matrix M by
σtr,s =
(
n−1∑
b=0
it(b) +
n−1∑
b=0
r(b)
)(
n−1∑
b=0
jt(b) +
n−1∑
b=0
s(b)
)
.
gives a low degree multiple of the original expression
of the entry, which is of maximum degree 3. In order
to incorporate σ into our equations, we can relabel
and multiply each entry of M to obtain the degree
3 expressions σmr,s. The number of equations intro-
duced as a result would be 2n−1(2n − 1), since M is
symmetric. An additional 2n − 1 linear expressions
are required for the row sums of the matrix i.e. the
new states of register S. This method would be quite
uneconomical for an algebraic attack. Alternatively,
let
M =


m0,0 m0,1 · · · m0,2n−1
m0,1 m1,1 · · · m1,2n−1
...
...
. . .
...
m0,2n−1 m1,2n−1 · · · m2n−1,2n−1

 ,
St =


St0,(0) S
t
0,(1) · · · S
t
0,(n−1)
St1,(0) S
t
1,(1) · · · S
t
1,(n−1)
...
...
. . .
...
St2n−1,(0) S
t
2n−1,(1) · · · S
t
2n−1,(n−1)

 .
The permutation action can then be described as the
multiplication
St = MSt−1.
Hence, we have
Sti,(b) =
2n−1∑
k=0
mb,kS
t−1
k,(b), 0 ≤ i ≤ 2
n − 1,
where the mu,v are the matrix entries of M. An ex-
amination into the equations generated reveals that
the equations can be simplified. Since it is known, the
off-diagonal ones can only appear at rows it and col-
umn it in M, which means that the other off-diagonal
entries of M are known to be zero. In particular, for
each bit 0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1, we have
Str,(b) =


2n−1∑
k=0
mb,kS
t−1
k,(b), r = i
mb,iS
t−1
i,(b) + mb,rS
t−1
r,(b), r 6= i.
These equations are of degree n+1. When r = i, the
expression St
r,(b) is of the form
Str,(b) =
n∏
b=0
jt(b)
2n−1∑
k=0
Stk,(b) + a = a,
where a is of degree n − 1. As discussed in Section
3.1, the first term is zero, and we equations are then of
degree n−1. Overall, the state permutation operation
results in n2n equations of maximum degree n+1 with
n2n variables representing values in the permutation
matrices M introduced at each clock. When r 6= i, it
is possible to move all terms to the left hand side and
obtain the equation
(Str,(b) +mb,iS
t−1
i,(b) +mb,rS
t−1
r,(b))(S
t−1
i,(b) +S
t−1
r,(b) +1) = 0.
This gives equations of degree 3. This alternative ap-
proach avoids relabelling of matrix entries, at the cost
of having more high degree equations in the system.
4.4 Keystream Generation
Finally, state extraction is used twice to obtain a
keystream word at each clock. Let rt be the index
of the state from which the keystream output is to be
taken. Then,
rt(b) = S
t
i,(b) +S
t
j,(b) =
2n−1∑
k=0
(
Sk,(b)
n−1∏
b=0
(it(b) + k(b))
)
+
2n−1∑
k=0
(
Sk,(b)
n−1∏
b=0
(jt(b) + k(b))
)
.
The keystream zt is then given by extracting state rt
of register S. Thus,
zt(b) = Srt,(b) =
2n−1∑
k=0
(
Sk,(b)
n−1∏
b=0
(rt(b) + u(b))
)
.
This amounts to 2n equations of degree n with n vari-
ables representing rt(0), r
t
(1), . . . , r
t
(n−1) introduced at
each clock, since zt is assumed to be known.
4.5 Additional Equations
As discussed in Section 3.1, each bit position of the
register S must sum to zero, that is,
2n−1∑
k=0
Sk,(b) = 0, 0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1.
This provides n additional linear equations at each
clock with no extra variables introduced.
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Operation e v d1 d2
Pointer Increment for i 0 0 0 0
Pointer Addition for j n n 3 n
State Permutation n2n n2n 3 n + 1
Keystream Generation 2n 2n n n
Additional Equations n 0 1 1
Table 1: Summary of Equations Generated for RC4.
For each clock, e is the number of equations gener-
ated, v is the number of variables introduced to the
system, and d1, d2 are the maximum degrees of the
equations with and without introducing low degree
multiples, respectively.
5 Discussion
Based on the results from the previous sections, the
number of equations generated at each clock for each
operation is summarised in Table 1. From these re-
sults, we present an analysis of the RC4 cipher against
algebraic attacks.
5.1 RC4 as an Algebraic Cipher
From the cipher description, one would normally ex-
pect the high nonlinearity of RC4 to arise from the
state permutation operation. However, if low degree
multiples are taken into account, it has been shown
from the above analysis that the high nonlinearity is
caused by state extraction, since there seems to be no
low degree equations that can describe the operation
in terms of the internal states. The state permuta-
tion, on the other hand, makes a primary contribution
to the number of equations generated from the cipher.
This is because it is the only operation that affects ev-
ery state of the register, rather than just certain words
or bits in the cipher. Not apparent from Table 1 is
the important role of word addition with its effect of
the carry bits. This operation relates all bits in each
word of the internal states, and yields a system of
equations that cannot be separated into smaller ones.
If word addition is not present, the system could be
split into n independent ones for each bit position,
which can be solved independently. This can dra-
matically reduce the time complexity of an algebraic
attack. It is quite interesting to see that each of the
three main operations involved in the RC4 stream ci-
pher has its own role in providing the overall security
of the cipher when realised from an algebraic point
of view, particularly since algebraic attacks had not
yet appeared in their current form at the time when
RC4 was designed. Together, the three operations in
RC4 yield a strong algebraic system, and forms the
basis of the resistance of the cipher against algebraic
attacks.
5.2 Implications for RC4-Like Ciphers
Similar observations would be expected to arise if the
same method of algebraic analysis is used on RC4
variants such as RC4A (Paul & Preneel 2004) and
VMPC (Zoltak 2004), due to the similarities of their
components. We also note that the algebraic prop-
erties of the three operations discussed above could
form a sound set of design criteria for potential ci-
phers of this type. Specifically, in order to provide
resistance to algebraic attacks, the cipher should con-
tain components whose operations consist of some
that translate to a large number of equations, some
to equations of high degree, and some to equations
that would make the whole system inseparable. An
important point to note from the algebraic analysis of
RC4 is that these algebraic properties need not come
from the same component. This is useful because
components that satisfy more properties may contain
operations that are more complicated and hence less
efficient. Security against algebraic attacks need not
be sacrificed for efficiency if careful tradeoffs are made
between the number of components and their alge-
braic properties.
5.3 Algebraic Attacks on RC4
From the equation analysis, we obtain n2n +3n equa-
tions in n2n + 3n variables at each clock of the ci-
pher. With a register size of 2n words, there are n2n
additional initial state variables, but there are also
n(2n +1) additional equations. Since each clock gives
n bits of output, we require keystream from at least
2n clocks before a unique solution could be obtained.
In fact, if no low degree multiples are used, we only re-
quire this amount of clocks to generate an overdefined
system with a unique solution. In total, there would
be 2n(n2n +3n) equations in 2n(n2n +3n+n(2n +1))
variables. For the common 8-bit RC4 cipher, this
gives a system of 534536 equations of maximum de-
gree 9 in 532480 variables. These equations are very
sparse, as each variable is only related to those at
the immediately preceding, current, and immediately
succeeding clocks. If low degree multiples are used,
the numbers of equations and variables may rise if
dependencies are found among the equations. More
information and experimental results on solving equa-
tions without low degree multiples will be presented
in Section 6.
The purpose of this paper is not to propose an al-
gebraic attack, but to consider the impact of applying
algebraic analysis techniques to non-algebraically ori-
ented stream ciphers. As such, we do not provide a
measure of the absolute or relative effectiveness of an
algebraic attack against the RC4 stream cipher and
its variants. Therefore, no comparisons are drawn
against existing attacks, and we do not claim any ad-
vantages or disadvantages of this method over any
existing ones. Sound complexity analyses on alge-
braic attacks are often difficult to reach due to their
reliance on algorithms for solving large sparse multi-
variate systems of equations of varying forms, which
in turn belongs to an area whose theory is yet to
be fully developed and documented. Nevertheless,
recent progress suggests that by implementing spe-
cialised routines to target equations generated from
particular ciphers, one can improve the efficiency of
equation solution greatly. These include the use of
Gro¨bner basis (Courtois & Patarin 2003) and the
Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) (Courtois & Bard 2007)
algorithms. As the research on algebraic attacks pro-
gresses it is quite reasonable to believe that equation
solution techniques will continue to improve in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important to dis-
cuss methods of generating systems of equations to
describe ciphers, so that the feasibility of solution to
these system and in turn the security of these respec-
tive ciphers can be constantly monitored into the fu-
ture.
6 Experiments
Actual equation generation and solution attempts
were made to verify the validity of the analysis and
the feasibility of a successful attack on RC4. Ta-
ble 2 shows the number of equations and variables
that would be generated for the cipher with different
word sizes. Our experiments were carried out using
Magma 2.14 (Bosma et al. 1997) running on one 64-
bit 1.6GHz Itanium 2 processor core on an SGI Altix
4700 supercomputer with 198 GB of shared memory.
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n Number of Number of Maximum
Variables Equations Degree
2 64 74 3
3 288 315 4
4 1280 1348 5
5 5760 5925 6
6 26112 26502 7
7 118272 119175 8
8 532480 534536 9
Table 2: Summary of Equations Generated for RC4
The full sets of equations for 2 ≤ n ≤ 3 have been
successfully generated without low degree multiples,
and their structures are in agreement with the anal-
ysis presented in Section 4. Using its Gro¨bner bases
package in F2, equations for n = 2 could be efficiently
solved using 4 bits of keystream generated from a ran-
domly chosen initial state. After more than 200 so-
lution trials with keystream generated from random
initial states, all of them returned a unique solution
between 5.0 and 5.3 seconds. However, a few solu-
tion trials have been run with equations generated
for n = 3, and were not successful after 48 hours of
computation time each. Further investigation would
be required to determine if it is infeasible to com-
pute a solution using Gro¨bner basis techniques, or
that the long computation time is caused by software
restrictions. Nevertheless, based on the results of the
experiment, we are quite confident in concluding that
the full version of RC4 with n = 8 is most likely im-
mune from algebraic attacks. This is based on the fact
that methods for solving polynomial equations, such
as Gro¨bner bases techniques, have time complexity
exponential in the maximum degree of the equations
(Becker & Weispfenning 1993). From our analysis in
Section 4 and Table 2, it can be observed that the
maximum degree of equations of RC4 rises linearly
with the word size, so the time complexity would be-
come infeasibly large very quickly.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the first algebraic analysis of a
non-LFSR based stream cipher, the RC4 family of
stream ciphers. A method was shown for obtain-
ing relationships between the internal states and the
keystream of the word-based stream cipher. The state
extraction, word addition, and state permutation op-
erations were represented in terms of algebraic rela-
tions. These were used to form systems of equations
describing the full keystream generation stage of the
cipher. From these equations, we observed that hav-
ing state extractions yields a system of high degree,
having word addition makes the equation system in-
separable, and state permutation is the main source
of equations. Together, these operations constitute
a strong systems of equations, in the sense that it
would be infeasible to solve using currently known
techniques. However, if any of these components are
compromised, the strength of the system and in turn
the security of RC4 against algebraic attacks would
likely be reduced. It is interesting to arrive at this ob-
servation, given that the design of RC4 predates the
introduction of algebraic attacks. Finally, our exper-
imental results with reduced versions of RC4 suggest
that the full RC4 is most likely immune from alge-
braic attacks at present. Further investigation into
the cryptographic properties of RC4 is warranted for
potential improvements on this first attempt at an
algebraic analysis of the cipher. The findings of the
algebraic properties of word-based operations in this
paper could also be used as a reference for the design
of future ciphers that make use of similar components.
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